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THE CHILEAN APPLES CASE: AN INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT
TO CLAIM DAMAGES FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
INSTITUTIONS FOR NON-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY IS
EXPANDED. Sofrimport S.a.r.l. v. Commission of the
European Communities, No. C-152/88, slip op. at
80, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 946 (Eur.
Comm. Ct. J. June 26, 1990).
I. FACTS
On March 31, 1988, Sofrimport S.a.r.l. (Sofrimport)' shipped from
Chile a cargo of 89,514 cartons of Chilean dessert apples for import
into the European Economic Community (EEC).2 Sofrimport applied
for an import license for these goods on April 12, 1988 with the
French intervention agency, ONIFLHOR, prior to their arrival at the
port of Marseilles on April 20, 1988.1 ONIFLHOR denied Sofrim-
I Sofrimport S.a.r.l., an importer and wholesaler of fresh fruit, is incorporated
under French law. Sofrimport S.a.r.l. v. Comm'n of the Eur. Communities, No.
C-152/88, sfip op. at 80, [19901 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 946 (Eur. Comm. Ct. J.
June 26 1990).
.2 The European Economic Community [hereinafter EEC] was formed under the
Treaty of Rome. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened
for signature, March 25, 1957, 1973 GR. BRIT. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-Il) (official
English trans.), 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) (unofficial English trans.) [hereinafter EEC
Treaty]. Article 2 of the EEC Treaty sets forth the purpose of the EEC. It reads:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States,
to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of ec-
onomic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in
stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations
between the States belonging to it.
Id. at art. 2. The EEC is composed of the following twelve Member States: France,
Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Greece, Portugal, Denmark, Ireland, and Spain.
S $ofrimport, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 946, at para. 3. Article XI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT], prohibits quan-
titative restrictions on imports such as quotas, import licenses or other measures by
any Contracting Party. McGovERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 186 (2d ed.
1986) [hereinafter McGovERN]. The European Community maintains a Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) which systematically imposes quantitative restrictions such
as quotas, tariffs and import licenses on imports to benefit domestic producers. Id.
at 448, 456. The legality of the EC's CAP under the GATT is a source of controversy,
and has been hotly contested by the United States and other members of the GATT.
Id. at 455-6.
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port's application on April 18, while Sofrimport's goods were still
in transit, because of EEC Regulations No. 962/88 and No. 984/88
which stipulated that applications for import licenses pending on
April 18, 1988 were to be rejected.4
Consequently, on May 26, 1988, Sofrimport brought an action
under Article 173 of the EEC Treaty' seeking the annulment of
Regulations No. 962/88, No. 984/88, and Regulation No. 1040/88
of April 20, 19886. Sofrimport also sought an order pursuant to
4 Commission Regulations (EEC) No. 962/88 of 12 April 1988 Suspending the
Issue of Import Licenses for Dessert Apples Originating in Chile, 31 O.J. EUR.
Comm. (No. L 95) 10 (1988) and No. 984/88 of 14 April 1988 Amending Reg. No.
962/88 Suspending the Issue of Import Licenses for Dessert Apples Originating in
Chile, 31 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 98) 37 (1988) respectively suspended the issue
of import licenses for dessert apples originating in Chile. Reg. No. 962/88 came
into force on April 13 and suspended the issue of import licenses for dessert apples
originating in Chile from April 15 to 22, 1988. Reg. No. 984/88 came into force
on April 15 and altered the suspension period to April 18 to 29, 1988. Report for
the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at paras. 4-5.
Article 173 of the EEC Treaty gives individuals the right to challenge EEC
legislative measures in the European Court of Justice when the regulation is of
"direct and individual concern" to that individual. The requirement of direct concern
involves the degree of discretion that the legislative measure leaves to the national
authorities. If the contested legislative measure leaves no discretion, then the affected
claimants are directly concerned. Sofrimport, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 946,
at para. 9. To be individually concerned, the applicant must be either the direct
addressee of the contested measure or must be affected by the contested measure
by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to the applicant or because of
circumstances which differentiate the claimant from all other persons. Spijker Kwasten
BV v. European Community Commission, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2559, [1984]
2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 284, at para. 8. The right of an individual to judicial review
under Article 173 is very narrow because the "direct and individual concern" test
is strictly construed and difficult to satisfy. Roberts, Judicial Review of Legislative
Measures: The European Court of Justice Breathes Life into the Second Paragraph
of Article 215 of the Treaty of Rome, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 246, 247 (1987)
[hereinafter Roberts]. See also, Bebr, Direct And Indirect Judicial Control of Com-
munity Acts in Practice: The Relation Between Articles 173 and 177 of the EEC
Treaty, 82 MicH. L. REv. 1229, 1248 (1984) (Article 173 results in occasional
unsuccessful attempts by private parties to bring annulment actions challenging
regulations) [hereinafter Bebr]; Stein & Vining, Citizen Access to Judicial Review
of Administrative Action In a Transactional and Federal Context, 70 AM. J. TRANs-
NAT'L L. 219, 223 (1976) (analyzing strict reading of "direct and individual concern"
requirement) [hereinafter Stein & Vining].
6 In Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1040/88 of 20 April 1988 Fixing Quan-
tities of Imports of Dessert Apples Originating in Third Countries and Amending
Reg. No. 962/88 Suspending the Issue of Import Licenses for Dessert Apples Orig-
inating in Chile, 31 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 102) 23 (1988), the EEC set import
quotas for dessert apples originating in the five apple-producing countries of the
Southern Hemisphere for the period ending on August 31, 1988. This regulation
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Article 215 (2) of the EEC Treaty7 that the EEC pay compensation
for damages caused by the denial of its import license application. 8
Included in Sofrimport's complaint was an application pursuant to
Article 186 of the EEC Treaty9 and Article 83 of the Rules of
Procedure for the Court of Justice of the European Communities 0
also called for suspension of import licenses for those countries which had exceeded
their limits and specifically named Chile as being over its 142,131 ton quota.
Accordingly, Reg. No. 1040/88 stated that import licenses for Chilean dessert apples
would not be issued until the end of the 1988 importing year on August 31, 1988.
Report for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at para. 8. The EEC promulgated Regs.
No. 962/88, No. 984/88 (see supra note 4), and No. 1040/88 pursuant to the system
of surveillance of dessert apple imports from non-member countries established by
Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 346/88 of 3 February 1988 Introducing Special
Surveillance of Imports of Dessert Apples from Third Countries, 31 O.J. EuR.
Comm. (No. L 34) 21 (1988). That surveillance system required an import license
for release of such fruit into free circulation in the EEC. The initial period of
validity of the import license was 30 days, but Commission Regulation (EEC) No.
871/88 of 30 March 1988 Amending Reg. No. 346/88 Introducing Special Surveillance
of Imports of Dessert Apples from Third Countries, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
87) 73 (1988), changed the duration to 40 days. Sofrimport, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt.
L. Rep. 946, at para. 2.
Sofrimport brought the action for compensation pursuant to Article 215(2) of
the EEC Treaty which provides that "in the case of non-contractual liability, the
Community shall, in accordance with general principles common to the laws of the
Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants
in the performance of their, duties." EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 215 (2).
Sofrimport, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 946, at para. 1.
I Sofrimport sought an order requiring the Community to pay compensation for
the harm caused by preventing it from marketing the Chilean dessert apples until
June 10, 1988 (the date of the interim court order allowing the release of Sofrimport's
imports). See infra text accompanying note 12. The damages claimed by Sofrimport
amounted to f 2,821,959.10, plus interest from the date of the court decision. Report
for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at para. 16. To assess damages, Sofrimport compared
the price it would have received for the apples in the absence of the import restrictions
to the price it did receive through mitigation. Sofrimport was able to sell 38,548
cartons in transit for f 67.10 per carton, a particularly low price because the market
was flooded with apples banned from the EEC. After the court order on June 10,
1988, Sofrimport sold the remaining apples for f 81.66 per carton. Sofrimport
asserted that the market price for identical apples from Chile in the EEC was f 103
per carton, thus it suffered a loss in the amount of f 2,468,220. Additionally,
Sofrimport claimed storage costs of f 159,787.60, transportation costs (to customs
warehouses) of f 161,000 and repackaging costs of f 32,951.50. Sofrimport also
sought interest at 9.5%. Report for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at paras. 57-58.
9 Article 186 of the EEC Treaty, supra note 2, reads: "[tihe Court of Justice
may in any case before it prescribe any necessary interim measures."
1o Article 83 of the Rules of Procedure reads: "[aln application for the adoption
of any other interim measures referred to in . . . Article 186 of the EEC Treaty
... shall be admissible only if it is made by a party to a case before the Court
and relates to that case." Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, 17 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 350) 1 (1974).
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for an order suspending Regulations No. 962/88, No. 984/88, and
No. 1040/88 with respect to the dessert apples then in storage at
Marseilles. "
The President of the Court granted Sofrimport's request for the
suspension of Regulations No. 962/88, No. 984/88 and No. 1040/
88 on June 10, 1988, thus allowing the importation of the stored
apples. 12 Sofrimport's claim for damages continued to be litigated,
and on June 26, 1990, the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities, held, Sofrimport has standing to challenge the regulations
under Article 173,' 3 and Regulations No. 962/88, No. 984/88, and
No. 1040/88 are void with regard to products in transit to the
Community; 4 in addition, the EEC must compensate Sofrimport's
damages resulting from the application of these regulations. 5
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Regulatory Background
The legal backdrop for the protective measures regarding imports
of dessert apples is set forth in Article 29(2) of Council Regulation
Sofrimport, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 946, at para. 5.
12 Id. at para. 22.
13 The Court held that Sofrimport is directly concerned by the challenged re-
gulations because they require the national authorities to reject pending applications
for import licenses and thus leaves the authorities no discretion. Id. at para. 9.
With regard to individual concern, the Court found that Sofrimport is in a restricted
group of importers sufficiently well-defined by the fact that Article 3(3) of R~glement
(CEE) Du Conseil du 19 D3cembre 1972 Numro 2707/72 Dfinissant les Conditions
D'application des Mesures de Sauvegarde du Secteur des Fruits et Ugumes, 15 J.0.
Comm. EUR. (No. L 291) 3 (1972), requires the Commission to consider the special
position of products in transit to the Community when adopting protective measures
for fruit and vegetables. Thus, those importers who had goods in transit at the time
the prohibition of import licenses went into effect were differentiated from other
importers and, therefore, were individually concerned. The Court also reasoned that
because Reg. No. 2707/72 gives specific protection to importers with goods en route,
these importers must therefore be able to enforce observance of that protection and
bring legal proceedings for that purpose. Sofrimport, [19901 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep.
946, at paras. 10-13.
'" Id. at para. 21.
"1 Id. at para. 29. The Court also ordered that interest at an 8% annual rate be
paid as of the date of the judgment and that the parties inform the Court within




No. 1035/72 of May 18, 1972,16 which established the common or-
ganization of the market in fruit and vegetables and provided for
the adoption of protective measures if the Community market is
threatened with serious disturbances. Article 3(3) of Council Regu-
lation No. 2707/72 of December 19, 1972, lays down the conditions
for applying protective measures to fruit and vegetable imports pur-
suant to Council Regulation No. 1035/72.1 Regulation No. 2707/72
requires that any protective measure adopted by the Commission shall
take account of the special position of goods in transit to the Com-
munity."8
On February 3, 1988 the Commission imposed protective measures
on the imports of dessert apples from third countries by adopting
Regulation No. 346/88.19 The Commission, fearing serious injury to
,6 R~glement (CEE) Du Conseil du 18 Mai 1972 Num6ro 1035/72 Portant Or-
ganisation Commune des Marchs dans le Secteur des Fruits et Lgumes, 15 J.O.
Comm. EuR. (No. L 118) 1 (1972). R glement (CEE) Du Conseil du 21 Novembre
1972 Num6ro 2454/72 Modifant le r~glement (CEE) No. 1035/72 Portant Organi-
sation Commune des Marchks dans le Secteur des Fruits et Ugumes, 15 J.O. Comm.
Eup. (No. L 266) 1 (1972), states that:
[a]ppropriate measures may be applied in trade with third countries if:
by reason of imports or exports, the Community market in one or more
of the products referred to in Article 1 experiences or is threatened with
serious disturbances which may endanger the objectives set out in Article
39 of the Treaty....
Report for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at para. 9.
17 Reg. No. 2702/72, supra note 13, provides that:
1. The measures which may be taken . . . are:
when the situation covered by the first indent of paragraph 1 of that
article exists, the suspension of imports or exports or the levying of
export taxes; ...
2. Such measures may only be taken in so far, and for as long, as they
are strictly necessary.
3. The measures provided for in paragraph 1 shall take account of the
special position of products in transit to the Community. They shall
apply only to products exported from, or intended for, third countries.
They may be limited to products exported from, originating in, or
intended for, certain countries, or to certain qualities, size, grades or
groups.
Report for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at para. 1 (emphasis added).
1" See supra notes 13, 17.
19 Reg. No. 346/88, supra note 6, introduced a system of special surveillance of
imports of third country dessert apples under which the release of dessert apples
for free circulation within the EC was made subject to the presentation of an import
license issued against the lodging of security of 1.5 ECU per 100 kilograms net.
Report for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at para. 2. Reg. No. 346/88 provided that
import licenses were to be issued five working days after application unless protective
measures are taken within that period. The initial 30 day period of validity for
import licenses was increased to 40 days by Reg. No. 871/88, supra note 6. Report
for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at para. 3.
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Community producers, perceived the need for additional protective
measures against the importation of dessert apples. Thus, on April
12, 1988, the Commission adopted Regulation No. 962/88 which
suspended the issue of import licenses for dessert apples originating
in Chile. 20 The Commission considered that the forty day period of
validity for import licenses under Regulations No. 346/88 and No.
871/88 allowed importers sufficient opportunity to obtain import
licenses before shipping their goods, so the Commission provided no
special protection for goods in transit at the time Regulation No.
962/88 was issued. 21
B. Non-Contractual Liability
Article 215(2) of the EEC Treaty provides the standard for non-
contractual liability of the European Community Institutions, and
states that this liability only arises where the act in question arises
out of the performance of an institutional task. 22 In Aktien-Zuck-
erfabik Sch6ppenstedt v. Council of the European Communities,23
the Court interpreted Article 215(2) of the EEC Treaty for the first
time,2 and articulated six elements to be considered in determining
Community liability. The Court ruled that the Community is only
liable for a legislative measure which is: "(1) illegal, because it (2)
violates a superior rule of law (3) which is for the protection of the
- See supra note 4. The Commission took this additional protective measure
because it considered that applications for import licenses covering Chilean dessert
apples exceeded the traditional quantity of imports of such products and that the
continuation of such imports might lead to serious disturbance of the market, so
as to jeopardize the objectives of Article 39 of the EEC Treaty and cause serious
injury to Community producers. Report for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at para.
4. Accordingly, the EEC promulgated Reg. No. 962/88 which suspended the issuance
of import licenses.
" The preamble to Reg. No. 962/88, supra note 4, states that:
[S]ince the period of validity of import licenses has been fixed so as to
cover amply the dispatch of dessert apples to the Community and to permit
the operators to obtain import licenses before the ships depart, no account
should be taken of goods being transported to the Community other than
those for which import licenses have been issued.
Report for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at para. 7 (emphasis added).
22 See supra note 7. Article 215(2) liability only relates to activities of the Com-
munity institutions performed in their institutional capacity. Stuart, The "Non-
Contractual Liability" of the European Economic Community, 12 Comm. MKT. L.
REv. 493, 497-8 (1975) [hereinafter Stuart, Non-Contractual Liability].
23 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 975, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8153, at 7752 (1971).
24 Roberts, supra note 5, at 251-52, n. 23.
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individual, (4) in a manner which is sufficiently flagrant and (5)
causes (6) damage".25 In the seminal Bayerische HNL Vermehrungs-
betriebe GmbH & Co. KG and others v. Council and Commission
of the European Communities(HNL)26 case, the Court reiterated the
Sch6ppenstedt formula and adopted an extremely narrow scope for
non-contractual liability of Community institutions. 27 In particular,
the HNL Court established a three part test for community liability
under Article 215(2): (1) a breach of a superior rule of law, (2) which
is sufficiently serious, and (3) the superior rule of law violated was
one for the protection of individuals.
In order to restrict the scope for non-contractual liability of the
Community, the Court in HNL indicated that not all legislative acts
which are found illegal give rise to Article 215(2) liability, 29 and
Roberts, supra note 5, at 251-52. The Schoppenstedt Court held:
In the present case the non-contractual liability of the Community presup-
poses at the very least the unlawful nature of the act alleged to be the
cause of the damage. Where legislative action involving measures of eco-
nomic policy is concerned, the Community does not incur non-contractual
liability for damage suffered by individuals as a consequence of that action,
by virtue of the promise contained in Article 215, second paragraph, of
the Treaty, unless a sufficiently flagrant violation of a superior rule of law
for the individual has occurred.
1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 984, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8153, at 7766 (emphasis added).
1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1209, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 566.
27 Article 215 (2) mandates that non-contractual liability of Community institutions
be in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member
States. See supra note 7. The principles of the Member States governing liability of
public authorities for damages caused to individuals indicate that only in exceptional
cases with special circumstances can public authorities incur liability for legislative
measures which are the result of a choice of economic policy. Therefore, the severe
criteria for non-contractual liability developed in the HNL case are consistent with
the laws of the Member States. Bronkhorst, Action for Compensation of Damages
Under Articles 178 and 215, para. 2, of the EEC Treaty; Stabilization and Devel-
opment, 1983 LEGAL IssuEs EUR. INTEGRAT'N No. 1, at 99, 111 [hereinafter Bron-
khorst].
n T.C. HARTLEY, TI-E FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN CoMMuNiTY LAW 474 (2d ed.
1988) [hereinafter HARTLEY].
2 In HNL the Court held:
Individuals may be required, in the sectors coming within the economic
policy of the Community, to accept within reasonable limits certain harmful
effects on their economic interests as a result of a legislative measure without
being able to obtain compensation from public funds even if that measure
has been declared null and void. In a legislative field such as the one in
question, in which one. of the chief features is the exercise of a wide
discretion essential for the implementation of the Common Agricultural
Policy, the Community does not therefore incur liability unless the institution
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focused on the "sufficiently flagrant" element of the Sch6ppenstedt
test. The HNL Court identified three factors which determine whether
a violation is "sufficiently serious" to warrant damages.30 The first
part of the HNL "sufficiently flagrant" test is the importance of
the superior rule of law that has been violated. 3' The second part of
the test is whether the enactment constitutes a manifest and grave
disregard for the limits of the institution's powers. 2 The final element
of the inquiry is the nature of the injury. This element requires that
the injury be of a special nature, only affecting a small number of
people, and of sufficient severity to exceed a reasonable level of
economic risk in the claimant's sector. 33 Thus, the standard for Com-
munity liability for legislative illegality under Article 215(2) espoused
in HNL and subsequent opinions on the proper measure and proof
of damages make it difficult for an individual to recover damages
because of challenged legislative acts.3 4
Despite the restrictive "sufficiently serious breach of a superior
rule of law for the protection of the individual" standard that was
applied in HNL, the Court has demonstrated some willingness to
concerned has manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on the exercise
of its powers.
1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1209, at para. 6 (emphasis added). Thus, even though
a legislative measure might be annulled under Article 173, the Community will not
incur Article 215(2) liability unless the Community institution has manifestly and
gravely disregarded the limits on the exercise of its powers. Lys~n, Three Questions
on the Non-Contractual Liability of the EEC, 1985 LEGAL IssuEs EutR. INTEGRAT'N
No. 2, at 86, 114 [hereinafter Lys~n].
0 Roberts, supra note 5, at 254.
11 Id. The superior rule of law breached by the allegedly illegal legislation must
be a fundamental rule or principle of Community law. See also Bronkhorst, supra
note 27, at 104. Note 40, infra, lists some fundamental principles of Community
law recognized by the Court.
32 Roberts, supra note 5, at 254. The essence of the manifest and grave disregard
inquiry is whether the enactment is "arbitrary"; i.e., could not have been enacted
under a reasonable, although mistaken, interpretation of the superior rule of law
at issue. Id. Another interpretation of "arbitrary" is suggested by Lysdn who defines
arbitrary legislative acts as enactments in the absence of an overriding Community
or public interest justifying the measures. Lys6n, supra note 29, at 113.
13 Roberts, supra note 5, at 279.
34 Id. at 280-81. The narrow scope of art. 215(2) of the EEC Treaty has been
reaffirmed by the Court in a line of cases following HNL. E.g., Roquette Freres
SA v. Comm'n of the Eur. Communities, 1989 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1553; Ireks-
Arkady GmbH v. Council and Comm'n of the Eur. Communities, 1979 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 2955; Deutsche Getreideverwertung Und Rheinishche Kraftfutterwerke
GmbH v. Council and Comm'n of the Eur. Communities, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 3017; Interquell Staxke-Chemie GmbH v. Council and Comm'n of the Eur.
Communities, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3045.
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find Community liability in situations where the legislative act adopted
was not illegal. In particular, the Comptoir National Technique Agri-
cole S.A. v. Comm'n of the Eur. Communities (CNTA)35 case man-
ifested a change of emphasis from the culpability of the administration
to the protection of the legitimate interests of the administered.3 6 In
CNTA the Court held that the Community was liable not for the
illegality of the legislative act in question, but rather for failing to
provide transitional measures.3 7 Because the Court in CNTA did not
find that the legislative measure was illegal on its face, but still held
the Community liable under Article 215(2) for the adoption of the
contested regulation, the Court recognized that Community liability
can arise even without meeting the strict HNL test where the adoption
of a legislative act creates liability if it is a result of a manifest and
serious disregard for the limits of the institution's discretionary power."8
C. Legitimate Expectations
The doctrine of protection of legitimate expectations plays a sig-
nificant role in the analysis of Article 215(2)39 non-contractual liability
in the EEC. This is because the protection of legitimate expectations
is a superior rule of law for the protection of the individual, the
11 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 533, [19771 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 171.
36 Stuart, Non-Contractual Liability, supra note 22, at 507.
17 The Court found the Community liable when the Commission withdrew the
payment of monetary compensation amounts for colza and rape seed by Commission
Regulation No. 189/72 - which had immediate effect without warning and without
transitional measures. Bronkhorst, supra note 27, at 101. The Court held:
In the absence of an overriding matter of public interest, the Commission
has violated a superior rule of law, thus rendering the Community liable,
by failing to include in Regulation No. 189/72 transitional measures for
the protection of the confidence which a trader might legitimately have had
in the Community rules.
CNTA, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 550, [19771 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 188
(emphasis added).
31 Commentators differ in their opinions on the significance of the CNTA case.
Lys6n argues that it may show that the particularity and the gravity of the damage
is unimportant in finding Community liability by holding that protection of legitimate
confidence in Community law is enough. Lys6n, supra note 29, at 113. Similarly,
Bronkhorst suggests that CNTA signifies a separate, less restrictive path to estab-
lishing Community liability for those individuals who have formed legitimate reliance
interests in Community law than the severe HNL test. Bronkhorst, supra note 27,
at 105. On the other hand, Roberts contends that the CNTA case represents a brief
period when the Court relaxed the standard for Community liability under article
215 (2), and the Court subsequently retracted from this relaxed position by adopting
the harsh HNL criteria for non-contractual liability. Roberts, supra note 5, at 253.
19 EEC Treaty, supra note 2.
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breach of which can give rise to non-contractual liability.4 A "le-
gitimate expectation" is defined as:
The particular form of economic prediction for which an economic
agent [private business or individual] can claim legal validity in
Community law, as being a belief that it was legitimate for him to
entertain as to the way in which he would be treated by an ad-
ministration in the application of Community regulations. 4'
A successful claim of legitimate expectations consists of several el-
ements .42 One of the central requirements is the absence of the fo-
reseeability of change in the Community rules or laws. 43 If the applicant
had notice of the change in the law in which he is claiming a legitimate
expectation or. if a reasonably prudent trader would have foreseen
the change, then he will not be able to maintain an action for the
protection of his legitimate expectations." Pursuant to this require-
-o Lys6n, supra note 29, at 115. Superior rules of law include all rules of the
unwritten law of the EEC deemed necessary and thus relevant for the lawful and
proper operation of the Community. Examples of a breach of a superior rule of
law for the protection of the individual include: infringements of human rights,
violations of a legitimate interest [expectation] in Community law, infringement of
a Council regulation by a Commission regulation (a situation which occurred in the
Sofrimport case). Id. Other examples of superior rules of law include the prohibition
of discrimination between producers and consumers within the Community and the
general principle of legal certainty. Bronkhorst, supra note 27, at 104.
41 Sharpston, Legitimate Expectations and Economic Reality, 15 EuR. L. REv.
No. 2 at 103, 105 (1990) [hereinafter Sharpston]. Thus, a legitimate expectation is
a legally protectable general principle common to the laws of the Member States.
See supra note 40.
4- Generally, a claimant seeking damages under Article 215(2) for a breach of
legitimate expectations must prove that he had a legitimate expectation on which he
acted in reliance and suffered loss as a result of the Community legislative measure.
Even then the claimant will not prevail if the Community measure is justifiable by
reason of an overriding matter of public interest. HARTLEY, supra note 28, at 144.
41 Stuart, Legitimate Expectations and Estoppel in Community Law and English
Administrative Law, 1983 LEGAL IssuEs EuR. INTEGRAT'N. No. 1 at 54 [hereinafter
Stuart, Legitimate Expectations]. See also Debayser SA, Sucre-Union SA and Jean
Lion SA v. Director of the Fonds d'Intervention et de R6gularisation du March6
du Sucre, Minister for Agriculture and Minister for the Budget, 1981 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 1291; S.A. Ancienne Maison Marcel Bauche and S.a.r.l. Frangois
Delquignies v. Administration Franqaise des Douanes, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
383.
- Sharpston, supra note 41, at 158. The policy behind not allowing a claim of
legitimate expectations where a prudent trader should have foreseen imminent change
is to not let a trader put himself in a better position by not taking due care than
that in which he would have been had he exercised all due care. Id. at 150. Therefore,
if an institution has given rise to justified hopes the trader may rely on the protection
of legitimate expectations, but if a prudent and discriminating trader could have
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ment that the change in Community law not be foreseeable, the
burden of being informed is placed on the individual claiming legit-
imate expectations. 45
Another requirement for a claim of legitimate expectations is that
the applicant must have acted or refrained from acting on the ex-
pectation. A mere hope for the continuance of the status quo will
not suffice to create a legitimate expectation.6 Also, this theory will
not be upheld where the previous situation was one of no real certainty
so that the contested action produced no real change. 47 Another
element of a successful claim for a violation of legitimate expectations
is that the applicant's claim must be objectively plausible in that a
reasonable economic agent should reasonably be able to form the
belief that his interests would not be damaged by the contested
legislation." Additionally, in situations where the applicant tries to
take advantage of a weakness in the Community system to make a
speculative profit, no legitimate expectations can be formed. 49
The many requirements for a successful claim of legitimate ex-
pectations reveal that it is extremely difficult for an applicant to
prevail in a direct action in obtaining damages from the Commission
or in having a regulation annulled because of a breach of legitimate
expectations. 0 This doctrine is essentially a form of equitable juris-
prudence which strikes a balance between checking the unfairness of
Community acts and refraining from interfering with the proper
exercise of discretionary legislative power.5
foreseen the adoption of Community measures likely to affect his interests, he cannot
plead legitimate expectations. Id. at 109. Also, changes in the underlying economic
conditions or circumstances can give notice of imminent change. Id. at 158.
41 Id. at 159.
- Id. at 158. Evidentiary and damage assessment concerns are the reasons behind
this requirement. Id.
, Id. at 122. See also Soci6t6 C.A.M. SA v. Comm'n of the Eur. Communities,
1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1393; Westzuck6r GmbH v. Einfuhr und Vorratstelle
fur Zucker, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 723.
48 Sharpston, supra note 41, at 158.
- Einfuhr und Vorratstelle fir Getreide und Futtermittel v. Firma C. Mackprang,
1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 607, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 198. See also
HARTLEY, supra note 28, at 143; Stuart, Legitimate Expectations, supra note 43, at
58.
, Stuart, Legitimate Expectations, supra note 43, at 59. For an example of a
case where a plaintiff prevailed on a claim of legitimate expectations see Meiko-
konservenfabrik v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2539
(winning plaintiff challenged a regulation which had retroactive effect, discriminated
between producers in similar circumstances, and breached plaintiff's legitimate ex-
pectations).
11 Stuart, Legitimate Expectations, supra note 43, at 73.
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III. ANALYSIS
In Sofrimport S.a.r.l. v. Commission of the European Commu-
nities, the Court of Justice of the European Communities held that
the EEC is liable to Sofrimport for damages caused by the contested
regulations because it found a sufficiently serious breach of a superior
rule of law for the protection of the individual.5 2 To reach this
conclusion, the Court noted three important factors: a breach of
legitimate expectations, a breach of Regulation No. 2707/72, and the
fact that the economic risks inherent in Sofrimport's business did
not include a breach of Regulation No. 2707/72.13 Each of these
decisional factors is important, but the linchpin of this decision is
the recognition of the doctrine of protection of legitimate expecta-
tions.5 '
The first of the three reasons mentioned by the court for imposing
liability on the EEC is the doctrine of protection of legitimate ex-
pectations." The Court observed that the purpose of Article 3(3) of
Regulation No. 2707/7256 is to protect importers of goods covered
by that regulation, particularly those traders who have goods in transit
at the time protective measures are adopted,7 from the unfavorable
consequences of protective measures which might be adopted by
European Community institutions. Therefore, the Court stated, Reg-
ulation No. 2707/72 "gives rise to a legitimate expectation the dis-
regard of which constitutes a breach of that superior rule of law. "58
The second basis for the finding of liability also involved Regulation
No. 2707/72 because the Court ruled that the Commission committed
a sufficiently serious breach of Article 3(3) of that regulation. The
Commission committed a sufficiently serious breach of Regulation
No. 2707/72 by completely failing to take account of the position
of traders who, like Sofrimport, had goods in transit to the EEC
when the license prohibition was adopted, without invoking any
overriding public interest.5 9 The third reason provided by the court
52 By finding a sufficiently serious breach of a superior rule of law for the
protection of the individual, the Court held that the HNL test for Article 215(2)
non-contractual liability is satisfied. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
" Sofrimport, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 946, at paras. 26, 27, 28.
1' See supra text accompanying note 41.
55 Id.
56 See supra notes 13, 17.
I Id.
Sofrimport, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 946, at para. 26.
9 Id. at para. 27. See supra notes 13, 17. (Reg. No. 2702/72 requires the
Commission to take account of goods in transit to the Community).
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for awarding damages focused on the limits of the risks inherent in
Sofrimport's business. The Court reasoned that the damage alleged
by Sofrimport was beyond the inherent risk of the import transaction
because the purpose of Regulation No. 2707/72 was to limit those
risks with regard to goods in transit. 60
Although the Court provided three reasons for its decision, close
examination of those reasons reveals that the principle underlying the
holding is the protection of legitimate expectations. For example, the
Court emphasized the fact that the Commission failed to invoke any
overriding public interest to explain its breach of Article 3(3) of
Regulation No. 2707/726. One of the basic tenets of the doctrine of
protection of legitimate expectations is that the EEC can absolve
itself of liability for breaching a legitimate expectation if it does so
because of an overriding public interest.62 Here, the Court's reliance
on the absence of an overriding public interest suggests that the
protection of legitimate expectations influenced the Court's finding
of a breach of Regulation No. 2707/72.
The doctrine of legitimate expectations also permeates the third
basis for the Court's holding, which in effect restates that doctrine.
By finding that the risks inherent in Sofrimport's business did not
include the risk of protective measures against goods in transit because
Regulation No. 2707/72 limits those risks, the Court is essentially
stating that Sofrimport had a legitimate expectation that no protective
measures would be adopted. The Court's logic implies that because
of the provisions of Regulation No. 2707/72, the risk of protective
measures affecting goods in transit was not foreseeable to Sofrimport.
Foreseeability of risk is one of the crucial inquiries into whether a
legitimate expectation has formed. 3 Therefore, all three of the reasons
supporting the Court's holding involve elements of the doctrine of
protection of legitimate expectations.
In addition to invoking elements of the doctrine of legitimate
expectations, the three reasons given for the imposition of liability
also satisfy the HNL6 test for a sufficiently serious breach of a
60 Id. at para. 28.
63 Id. at para. 27.
62 In one of the exceptional cases where legitimate expectations led to EEC liability,
the dispositive factor noted by the court was a breach of a superior rule of law
without any overriding matter of public interest. Sharpston, supra note 41 (emphasis
added) (referring to CNTA, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 533, [19771 1 Comm. Mkt.
L. Rep. 171).
63 See supra notes 43-4 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 26.
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superior rule of law for the protection of the individual. 65 First, the
Court recognized Sofrimport's legitimate expectation in not being
denied an import license once its goods were in transit as a superior
rule of law. This finding comports with the first part of the HNL
test which requires that the rule of law breached be a fundamental
rule or principle of Community law. 66 Second, the Court ruled that
the Commission erred by failing to take account of goods in transit
without justification by an overriding matter of public interest as
required by Regulation No. 2707/72. This failure to follow the stric-
tures of a Council regulation without justification is exactly the kind
of arbitrary legislative act that meets the manifest and grave disregard
of legislative power requirement of the HNL test. 67 Likewise, the
third basis for the Court's holding literally tracks the language of
the final part of the HNL criteria for a sufficiently serious breach.
Both here and in HNL the Court spoke of injury that exceeded the
level of risk inherent in the claimant's business sector. 68 Thus, the
Court's holding seems to rest on both the doctrine of legitimate
expectations and on the HNL criteria for non-contractual liability.
The Sofrimport Court demonstrated a heretofore unseen recep-
tiveness to the doctrine of legitimate expectations, in addition to
basing its decision on that doctrine and the HNL formula. 69 Con-
sidering the restrictive interpretation of standing under Article 17370
and the Commission's argument that Sofrimport had notice of the
adoption of protective measures, the Court had ample grounds for
denying relief to Sofrimport. Article 173 of the EEC Treaty7l allows
an individual to challenge the validity of legislative measures that
directly and individually concern the claimant, but this right to judicial
review is strictly construed and is thus extremely narrow.72 One prin-
ciple that narrows the availability of Article 173 is the rule that no
private person can challenge a general regulation which is defined as
" HNL establishes a three part formula for a breach of a superior rule of law
for the protection of the individual to be sufficiently flagrant to warrant Article
215 (2) liability. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
67 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
- See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
Few cases prevail on a legitimate expectations theory. Sharpston, supra note
41, at 160.
70 See supra note 5.
71 See supra note 2.
72 See supra note 5.
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a regulation that applies to categories of persons treated theoretically. 71
Although the Commission did not contest Sofrimport's right to ju-
dicial review under Article 173, the Court could have dismissed the
action on its own motion had it decided that the "direct and individual
concern" test was not met.
74
Indeed, the Advocate General strenuously argued that the Court
should have denied Sofrimport's claim for relief by dismissing the
action as inadmissable under Article 173.71 The thrust of the Advocate
General's argument is that Sofrimport was not directly and individ-
ually concerned with Regulation No. 962/88 because it is a general
regulation not addressed to a specific and identified group, but rather
to a category of traders who were not and could not have been
identified individually when the measure was adopted. 76 Thus, ac-
cording to the Advocate General, Sofrimport could not challenge its
validity under Article 173 because it failed to satisfy the "direct and
individual concern" test .77
Despite the vigorous arguments of the Advocate General, the Court
held that regulations No. 962/88 and No. 984/88 were of direct and
individual concern to Sofrimport, so an action for annulment under
Article 173 was maintainable. 78 By allowing Sofrimport to challenge
the contested regulations under Article 173, the Court vindicated one
of the primary functions of an Article 173 annulment action which
73 Stein & Vining, supra note 5, at 224. This principle that a private individual
cannot challenge a general regulation underlies the narrow "direct and individual
concern" standard of Article 173. Id.
14 Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, Sofrimport, [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.
Rep. 946, at para. 2.
71 Id. at para. 9.
76 Id. at para. 4. One reason for finding Reg. No. 962/88 to be a general regulation
suggested by the Advocate General is that the Commission could not have known
the identities of the traders who would be affected by the regulation. The identities
of at least some of the traders would be unknown to the Commission because it
affected traders who applied for import licenses after the regulation was adopted.
Id. Another reason that the Advocate General considers that the contested regulation
was general in nature is that the Commission made its decision to institute protective
measures not on the basis of the number of applications lodged, but rather on the
basis of a combination of relevant economic factors in the market. Therefore,
applications lodged by individual traders would simply be a part of the total volume
examined by the Commission. Id. at para. 5. The third reason the Advocate General
advanced for finding the contested regulation to be general was that Reg. No. 962/
88 gave no special consideration to traders with goods in transit, so those traders
were viewed in the same light as all of the other traders. Id. at para. 6.
11 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
78 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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is to allow private parties to protect themselves against illegal actions. 79
Additionally, the Court demonstrated an unusual receptiveness to a
private party's action for damages against the Commission by allowing
Sofrimport to maintain the action because the Court could have
denied Sofrimport Article 173 standing consistently with the strict
construction of that provision.
The second indication of the Court's rare amenability to a private
individual's action for damages under Article 215 (2) lies in the Court's
refusal to adopt the Commission's primary arguments. Specifically,
the Commission argued in favor of denying relief on the basis that
Sofrimport had notice of the possibility of adoption of protective
measures, and, therefore, was not able to form any legally protectable
legitimate expectations. The source of this notice, claims the Com-
mission, is that the wording of Regulation No. 346/8880 put importers
on notice that within five working days of an application being lodged
the Commission might take action to ensure that licenses were not
issued. Thus no legitimate expectation could be formed by an im-
porter.8' In support of this contention, the Commission relies on the
precedent of the Roomboterfabrik "De Beste Boter" BV v. Pro-
duktschap voor ZuiveP2 case where the Court held that a regulation,
whose wording was substantially the same as Regulation No. 362/
88 in that it provided a five day reflection period before granting
export certificates, provided sufficient notice of the possibility that
the application would be denied to defeat reliance. In this case the
Court could have followed this close precedent and held that Sof-
rimport had notice of the possibility that protective measures would
be adopted - notice that would defeat Sofrimport's claim of legitimate
expectations."3 Instead, the Court upheld Sofrimport's legitimate ex-
pectations.
From a broader perspective, the Court's receptiveness to the doc-
trine of legitimate expectations represents a movement to conformity
to the spirit of Article XIII, paragraph 3(b) of the General Agreement
,9 See, Bebr, supra note 5, at 1232.
9 See supra note 4.
Report for the Hearing, Case C-152/88, at para. 46.
1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3331 (Five day reflection period for export certificate
applications held to be a contingent entitlement to certificate because applicant had
notice that "special measures" might be adopted during five day waiting period).
11 Notice of the possibility of a change in the legal circumstances will defeat a
claim of legitimate expectations. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)84 regarding goods in transit. Under
the GATT, goods which are en route when notice of a suspension
of import licenses is given must be allowed entry. 5 On the other
hand, Regulation No. 2707/726 merely requires the Commission to
take account of goods in transit to the Community, and does not
guarantee access to the Community for all products during all in
transit situations.8 7 By upholding Sofrimport's legitimate expectation
that it would be granted an import license, the Court acted consistently
with the spirit of GATT Article XIII, paragraph 3(b) while not
vitiating the wording of Regulation No. 2707/72. Rather than an
absolute requirement for entry of goods en route, the Court uses the
doctrine of legitimate expectations to reach an equitable result of
allowing entry for goods of traders who have no notice of import
suspension before they act in reliance on the current import scheme.
The apparent synthesis in Sofrimport of the HNL test 88 with the
CNTA approach to non-contractual liability89 has broad ramifications
for the future behavior of the Commission. Rather than relying on
legislative discretion as a shield from individuals' claims for com-
pensation under Article 215 (2), Commission regulations now must
meet the more exacting standard of not breaching individuals' legit-
imate expectations. Thus, the Commission will have to provide more
information and notice to the public to defend against the formation
of legitimate expectations. In addition, the Court demonstrated a
rare receptiveness to an individual's challenge of a Commission reg-
ulation. Therefore, the Court in this case opens the door for indi-
' This subsection states in pertinent part:
Any supplies of the product in question which were en route at the time
at which public notice was given shall not be excluded from entry; Provided
that they may be counted so far as practicable, against the quantity permitted
to be imported in the period in question, and also, where necessary, against
the quantities permitted to be imported in the next following period or
periods ....
GATT, supra note 3, art. XIII: 3(b). (emphasis in original).
11 McGovERN, supra note 3, at 192. This requirement takes the form of an
absolute obligation to allow entry. Id.
" See supra note 13.
8 See supra note 17. Although not directly applicable, the provisions of the
GATT are binding on the Community insofar as the Community has assumed the
powers previously exercised by Member States in the areas governed by the GATT.
International Fruit Co. v. Produktschapvoor Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 1219, [1975] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 1.
" See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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viduals who have legitimate reliance interests to recover from the
legislative and regulatory entities in the EEC, thus providing a chilling
effect on those regulatory bodies' willingness to test the bounds of
their legislative discretion.
IV. CONCLUSION
The fundamental basis for the European Court of Justice's holding
in Sofrimport is that the Commission of the European Economic
Community breached Sofrimport's legitimate expectations that it would
be able to import its Chilean dessert apples and those legitimate
expectations constituted a superior rule of law for the protection of
the individual. In this case, however, the Court seemed to reconcile
the doctrine of legitimate expectations and the HNL test for non-
contractual liability. Before Sofrimport, the exceedingly strict HNL
criteria were considered a separate path to non-contractual liability
of the Community from cases such as CNTA, which upheld legitimate
expectations as a basis for Community liability. Furthermore, the
Court had ample grounds before it to dismiss the complaint both
for lack of Article 173 standing to challenge the contested regulations
and for a lack of legitimate expectations on the part of Sofrimport.
Both Article 173 standing and a finding of legitimate expectations
are rare occurrences in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of
the European Communities. However, in this case the unusual oc-
curred and the Court imposed Article 215(2) on the Commission.
Sofrimport might be the herald of a new, less stringent approach to
Community liability. In addition, the Court has fulfilled the spirit
of GATT Article XIII, paragraph 3(b) by requiring the Commission
to compensate Sofrimport after the Commission failed to take account
of goods en route when it banned imports of dessert apples. Thus,
the Court may be signaling a more lenient attitude toward Community
liability in the face of the impending formation of the Internal Market
and closer international scrutiny of its import licensing policy.
Douglas C. Turner
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